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Abstract
Fingerprint verification systems are becoming ubiquitous in every-
day life. This trend is propelled especially by the proliferation of mo-
bile devices with fingerprint sensors such as smartphones and tablet
computers, and fingerprint verification is increasingly applied for au-
thenticating financial transactions. In this study we describe a novel
attack vector against fingerprint verification systems which we coin
skilled impostor attack. We show that existing protocols for perfor-
mance evaluation of fingerprint verification systems are flawed and as
a consequence of this, the system’s real vulnerability is systematically
underestimated. We examine a scenario in which a fingerprint verifi-
cation system is tuned to operate at false acceptance rate of 0.1% us-
ing the traditional verification protocols with random impostors (zero-
effort attacks). We demonstrate that an active and intelligent attacker
can achieve a chance of success in the area of 89% or more against this
system by performing skilled impostor attacks. We describe a new
protocol for evaluating fingerprint verification performance in order
to improve the assessment of potential and limitations of fingerprint
recognition systems. This new evaluation protocol enables a more in-
formed decision concerning the operating threshold in practical ap-
plications and the respective trade-off between security (low false ac-
ceptance rates) and usability (low false rejection rates). The skilled
impostor attack is a general attack concept which is independent of
specific databases or comparison algorithms. The proposed protocol
relying on skilled impostor attacks can directly be applied for evaluat-
ing the verification performance of other biometric modalities such as
e.g. iris, face, ear, finger vein, gait or speaker recognition.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
The use of fingerprints for establishing the identity of a person has a long
history. Impressions discovered on earthenware in northwest China are es-
timated to be 6000 years old (see Chapter 1 in [1]). In 1892, Galton [2]
published an influential book in which he explored the uniqueness and per-
sistence of fingerprints. Law enforcement agencies have been employing
fingermarks left at crime scenes for identifying suspects routinely and suc-
cessfully in forensic investigations for more than a century [3].
Beyond forensic and governmental applications like border control, fin-
gerprints are increasingly used in commercial applications for check-in at
workplaces or libraries, for access control at amusement parks or zoos, and
for unlocking mobile computers like laptops, tablet computers or smart-
phones. The trend of fingerprint sensors on mobile devices drives the per-
vasion of everyday life with fingerprint technology. Mobile phones with
fingerprint sensors have been developed years ago by Siemens (1998), by
Sagem (2000), by Fujitsu (2003), by Motorola (2008) and by many other
companies, however, especially Apple and Samsung propel the widespread
use of fingerprints on smartphones. The European Association for Biomet-
rics considers the release of the iPhone 5s in September 2013 to herald a
paradigm shift [4]. 317 million units of fingerprint-enabled devices are ex-
pected to be shipped by the end of 2014 and IHS predicts this number to
increase to 1.4 billion units in 2020 [5].
A second emerging trend is the authentication of payments and other
financial transactions by biometrics. In addition to mobile payment services
by Apple, Samsung and others, a credit card with a fingerprint scanner has
been developed by Zwipe and MasterCard [6].
Traditional two-factor authentication relies on a possession factor such
as a card for an automated teller machines (ATM) or a credit card and
on a knowledge factor such as a personal identification number (PIN) or a
password. A biometric factor such as a fingerprint or a signature can be
used as a third factor to increase the security of a system. For example, in
an ATM scenario, a customer could be asked for an ATM card, a PIN and
a fingerprint (three-factor authentication) before being able to withdraw
money. The aforementioned credit card with a fingerprint sensor enables
two-factor authentication (possession factor and biometric factor). In this
specific application, fingerprint recognition replaces a PIN [7]. Choices for
certain types of multi-factor authentication involve always a trade-off be-
tween security and convenience.
The prospect of ubiquity of devices with fingerprint sensors paired with
the trend towards authenticating financial transactions by fingerprint recog-
nition creates a strong motivation to analyze the security and vulnerability
of fingerprint recognition systems as well as associated privacy concerns.
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2 Attacks
As fingerprinting is becoming ubiquitous and together with the rise of com-
mercial applications relying on fingerprints, it is also becoming increasingly
attractive for criminals to attack fingerprint recognition systems.
In this section, we consider three different kind of attacks on fingerprint
verification systems: spoof attacks [8, 9, 10, 11], zero-effort attacks and
skilled impostor attacks. The first two types of attacks are well known, the
third type has not been considered by the research community so far.
All three types of attacks are so-called direct attacks [11] which means
that point of attack is the fingerprint sensor. Typically, the sensor is assumed
to be publicly accessible.
Further kinds of attacks are conceivable against internal modules and
communication channels of a fingerprint system, e.g. an attacker could try
to modify a template stored in a database or attempt to replace the feature
extraction module by a malicious software. This category of attacks is called
indirect attacks and not considered here.
2.1 Spoof Attacks
A spoof finger is a fake finger made from artificial material such as e.g. latex,
wood glue, silicone, or gelatin. The spoof finger is presented to the sensor in
order to impersonate a genuine user of the system, therefore spoof attacks
belong to the category of presentation attacks [10]. We can distinguish
between three different ways to fabricate fake fingers. Spoof fingers can be
produced with the cooperation of the genuine user as a so-called direct cast,
without cooperation (indirect cast) or from a synthetic fingerprint image.
In the cooperative scenario, the person presses his or her finger into a
mold made of e.g. modeling putty like plasticine or candle wax. The spoof
is created by inserting e.g. silicone or gelatin into the mold. An example
for a cooperative attack on a fingerprint system was reported by the police
of Ferraz de Vasconcelos, near Sao Paulo, Brazil, in March 2013. A doctor
was caught on camera forging the check-in of absent co-workers. She had six
silicone fingers with her at the time of her arrest. Subsequent investigations
revealed that as many as 300 civil servants in that town were receiving pay
packets without going to work [12].
In the non-cooperative scenario, a fingerprint from the target of imper-
sonation is acquired without agreement or help of that person, e.g. by lifting
a latent fingerprint from a glass previously touched by that person. Typical
steps of fingerprint image preprocessing [13] can be applied to improve the
visualization of the latent fingerprint: Segmentation into foreground and
background [14], orientation field estimation (e.g. by the line sensor method
[15]) and image enhancement [16, 17]. The enhanced image can be printed
to obtain a mold [10]. This kind of attack has been demonstrated by mem-
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bers of the Chaos Computer Club in Germany against the Apple iPhone 5S
immediately after its release in September 2013 [18]. The same approach
was also successful to show the vulnerability of the Samsung Galaxy S5 to
spoof fingers. An additional attack vector in the non-cooperative scenario
is the reconstruction of a fingerprint image from a minutiae template which
can be achieved e.g. using amplitude- and frequency-modulated (AM-FM)
functions [19]. A list of references to further reconstruction methods is pro-
vided by [20]. Consequently, if an attacker can steal a database of minutiae
templates from a server or cloud storage, it is possible to reconstruct the
corresponding fingerprint images and create spoof fingers from those.
A third possibility is to generate a synthetic fingerprint image and create
a spoof finger from it. It has recently been shown that existing methods for
generating artificial fingerprint images tend to produce synthetic fingerprints
with unrealistic minutiae configurations [20]. Analyzing and representing
templates by minutiae histograms (MHs) [20] enables to separate between
real and synthetic fingerprints. More specifically, a template can be classified
as real or synthetic by computing the earth mover’s distance [21] between
the template’s MH and the mean MHs of real and synthetic fingerprints.
Despite being unrealistic, an attacker could attempt to enroll a spoof finger
of a synthetic fingerprint to fingerprint recognition system and if successful,
this virtual identity could also be shared by several attackers.
2.2 Zero-Effort Attacks
A zero-effort attack against a fingerprint verification system is to present
a real and alive finger to the sensor in combination with the claim of an
identity not associated with this finger. For example, let us assume that
Alice is a legitimate user of a fingerprint verification system and costumer
of a bank using three-factor authentication (bank card, PIN and fingerprint)
During the enrollment phase, she was registered to the database of the
bank and e.g. a minutiae template extracted from a fingerprint of Alice was
stored together with information about her identity.
In order to draw money from an ATM, Alice presents her bank card
(which makes an implicit claim regarding her identity), she types in her
PIN and presents her finger to the sensor. Alice is a legitimate user of the
system and verification attempt is also called “genuine recognition attempt”.
Let us assume that an attacker called Mallory somehow attains posses-
sion of Alice’s bank card and learns her PIN. If Mallory now uses one of her
own fingers together with the bank card and PIN from Alice, trying to draw
money and debit Alice’s bank account, then Mallory performs a zero-effort
attack on the fingerprint recognition system. Traditionally, this attack is
known as “impostor recognition attempt” in the literature [22].
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Figure 1: The signature of a genuine user is depicted in (a). A skilled forgery
is shown in (b) and a casual forgery in (c). An example of a random forgery
is illustrated in (d). This Figure is reproduced from the work of Coetzer et
al. [23]. See especially Figures 1-3 in [23].
2.3 Skilled Impostor Attacks
A comparison algorithm computes a similarity (score) between two finger-
print feature sets, e.g. between Alice’s minutiae template in the database
and a second minutiae template extracted from the finger currently placed
on the sensor. Based on the score s and the threshold t, the system decides
to accept, if s ≥ t, or to reject otherwise.
In the described verification scenario (one-to-one comparison) at the
ATM, a fingerprint recognition system can make two types of errors. It
can produce a false accept (e.g. accept Mallory’s finger with the claim to be
Alice’s) or a false reject (e.g. reject Alice although she is a legitimate user
and she placed the same finger on the sensor that has been enrolled earlier).
The operational threshold t of fingerprint verification system can be cho-
sen to balance the two goals security (few false accepts) and usability (few
false rejects) for an application scenario. Let us assume the ATM system
has a false accept rate of 0.1% measured against the traditional zero-effort
attacks. Let us further assume that the ATM system implements a perfect
liveness detection method which defends the system against all spoof attacks
with 100% accuracy. How can Mallory attack such a system, if she knows
Alice’s fingerprint, but a spoof attack is not possible? If Mallory is part of a
criminal organization, she can proceed in the following way to optimize the
chances of a successful attack. She acquires the fingerprints of all accom-
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plices and she uses a fingerprint comparison algorithm to find the fingerprint
which is most similar to Alice’s fingerprint. Say, this is one of Sybil’s fingers.
Then, Sybil attacks the ATM using her selected finger together with Alice’s
bank card and PIN. We denote this kind of attack as skilled impostor attack
in allusion to skilled forgeries in signature verification (see [23] and Figure
1). An example of a skilled impostor attack for fingerprint recognition is
shown in Figure 2. You can imagine that fingerprint in Figure 2 on the left
belongs to Alice and print in Figure 2 on the right belongs to the skilled
impostor Sybil. Scrutinizing the details in Figure 2 it is discernible that the
figure depicts two fingerprints originating from two different fingers. At the
same time, it is very understandable why an algorithm can compute a high
similarity value on comparing these two fingerprints which ultimately can
result in a false accept.
The assumption that Mallory is not acting on her own, but with accom-
plices is quite realistic as many news reports confirm. E.g. in October 2011
a break-in occurred at grocery store in Goettingen, Germany [24]. Only
later the police learned that the main objective of the break-in was not to
steal goods, but to manipulate the bank card reader at the cash point. The
forged readers recorded bank card data and PINs between the 10th of Oc-
tober and the 4th of November. The criminals took possession of the data
by a second break-in in the night from the 4th to 5th November. One and
a half day later, the first money withdrawals took place in Mexico and the
USA. This is an example of a so-called skimming case. Identity theft and
skimming are two very relevant types of credit card fraud and a possible
countermeasure is three-factor authentication with fingerprint verification.
In the next section, we describe the traditional protocol and we propose
a new protocol for evaluating the performance of fingerprint verification
systems and afterwards we examine the chances of successful skilled impostor
attacks using publicly available fingerprint databases and state-of-the-art
software for fingerprint verification.
3 Protocols
Let us assume that we have a fingerprint database containing images of n
different fingers denoted as f1, ..., fn and we have m different impressions for
each finger which are given in a certain order. For each fingerprint fi and
its j-th impression, we denote by vij the corresponding feature vector which
can be a fingerprint image, a minutiae template or some other feature. Fur-
ther, we have a comparison algorithm M (colloquially called a “matcher”)
which takes feature vectors vij and vxy of two fingerprints fi and fx as in-
put and computes a similarity value s (“score”) as output. A higher score
corresponds to a greater similarity. We define two protocols in the following
way.
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Figure 2: This skilled impostor recognition attempt shows finger no. 28
impression 7 from FVC2002 DB1 (left) which is attacked by finger no. 20
impression 1 from FVC2004 DB1. The automatic comparison algorithm
paired 7 minutiae (highlighted in color, unpaired minutiae are shown in
white) and computed a similarity score of 120. For a human observer it is
clearly discernible that the two fingerprints originate from two different fin-
gers. For example, counting the intersecting ridge lines between the orange
and cyan minutiae results in four ridges for the finger on the left and seven
for the finger on the right. Additionally, for the print on the right, there is a
minutia clearly visible on the left beneath the cyan minutia which does not
exist in the print on the left.
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Verification test with random impostors
Genuine recognition attempts: For each of the n fingers, each impression
of a finger fi is compared to every other impression of the same finger fi
while avoiding mirrored comparisons. By mirrored comparison we denote in
general that vxy is not compared to vij , if previously vij has been compared
to vxy. (For genuine recognition attempts, here i = x). Hence, the first
impression of finger fi is compared to all other impressions of finger fi.
The second impression of finger fi is compared to all other impressions of
finger fi except for the first. The third impression of finger fi is compared
to all other impressions of finger fi except for the first and second, and so
on. In total, this protocol carries out cgen =
n·m·(m−1)
2 genuine recognition
attempts.
Impostor recognition attempts: For each of the n fingers, the first a im-
pressions of finger fi are compared to first a impressions of every other
finger in the database while avoiding mirrored comparisons. This leads to
cimp =
n·(n−1)·a2
2 impostor recognition attempts.
Verification test with skilled impostors
Genuine recognition attempts: We perform exactly the same above de-
scribed cgen =
n·m·(m−1)
2 genuine recognition attempts.
Impostor recognition attempts: For each of the n fingers and for each of
the first a impressions of finger fi, we search the k most similar impressions
considering the first u impressions of every other finger in the database.
Similarity is measured by the comparison algorithm M . Only the k most
similar impressions are taken into account as impostor recognition attempts.
In total, we have cimp = n · a · k skilled impostor recognition attempts.
As standard values for verification tests with skilled impostors we suggest
a = u = m which means that every image (or template) in the database is
considered as a target for impersonation and k = 1 which corresponds to an
attack by the most skillful attacker. Moreover, we suggest to include further
available fingerprint databases for skilled impostor attacks if a database
contains only a small number of unique fingers n. Additionally, for both
protocols it should be checked whether M is symmetric, i.e. M(vij , vxy) =
s = M(vxy, vij) for all fingers and impressions. If M is not symmetric, the
otherwise avoided mirrored comparisons should also be carried out.
4 Results
The protocol for a verification test with random impostors is - to the best
knowledge of the author - the only one which used in existing evaluations
of fingerprint verification performance. Prominent examples are the FVC
protocol described in [25] and the evaluations on the GUC100 database [26].
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The experiments in this study are based on the publicly available finger-
print databases of FVC2000 [25], FVC2002 [27], FVC2004 [28] and we use
a commercial software as comparison algorithm. First, we conduct a tradi-
tional verification test with random impostors. We use FVC2002 DB1 as
the bank database in our scenario, because it is a database with mostly good
quality images. The databases of FVC2004 contain many low-quality images
and are employed for comparing fingerprint image enhancement algorithms
(see e.g. [16, 17, 29, 30]) using the traditional protocol of verification tests
with random impostors.
Each FVC database comprises a training set of 10 fingers and a test set
of n = 100 fingers. For each finger, m = 8 impressions are available. This
results in cgen =
n·m·(m−1)
2 = 2800 genuine recognition attempts. The FVC
protocol takes t = 1 impressions for random impostors into account, there-
fore it carries out cimp =
n·(n−1)·a2
2 = 4950 impostor recognition attempts.
The observed verification performance is visualized as a blue detection
error tradeoff curve in Figure 4. An equal error rate of 0.92% is obtained
at a threshold of t = 33. The FMR1000 [22] is observed at a threshold of
t = 48, i.e. the empirical probability for a false match is less or equal to
0.1% at this threshold.
Let us return to the imagined ATM scenario with Alice’s fingerprint in
the bank database and we assume that the bank implements this system
for fingerprint verification with an operational threshold of t = 48, i.e. ac-
cepting all recognition attempts yielding a score of s ≥ 48, and rejecting
all other recognition attempts. For the sake of argument, we neglect issues
pertaining to repeatability and reproducibility of measurements in biometric
performance testing [31], and to put it simply, we say that Mallory’s chances
of a successful attack against the ATM fingerprint verification system using
a random finger (e.g. one of her own ten fingers) are one in a thousand.
Next, we perform a verification test with skilled impostors and we assess
how much the chances for a successful attack can be improved by replacing
random impostor attacks with skilled impostor attacks. To this end, we
utilize the available databases of real fingerprints (DB1, DB2 and DB3) from
FVC2000, FVC2002 and FVC2004. We ignore DB4 of each competition
which contains synthetic fingerprint images.
The databases of real fingerprints (DB1, DB2 and DB3) from FVC2000,
FVC2002 and FVC2004 contain in total 990 fingers. Interestingly, the skilled
impostor attack revealed not all fingers are unique across different FVC
databases. Using the fingers in FVC2002 DB1 as targets we discovered that
in some cases exactly the same finger appeared also in a second, different
database. Two examples of duplicates are shown in Figure 3. The discovered
duplicates have been excluded from the verification test.
Mallory can improve her chances of a successful attack on Alice’s bank
account from 0.1% for random impostor attacks to 88.875% for skilled im-
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postor attacks. We have observed that in 711 out of 800 attempts a score of
48 or greater has been achieved by the skilled impostor. A score of s = 120
has been computed for the example shown in Figure 2. The verification per-
formance for this test with skilled impostors is depicted as a red detection
error tradeoff curve in Figure 4.
Moreover, we performed a second verification test with skilled impostor
attacks against the same 800 images of FVC2002 DB1. For the attack, we
used a second database which contains more fingers than all FVC databases
combined and the image quality is also higher. In this second test, all 800
skilled impostor attacks were successful.
These results demonstrate how important it is to take skilled impos-
tor attacks into account when determining the operational threshold for a
fingerprint verification system.
5 Conclusion
We have described a new attack vector on fingerprint verification systems
denoted as skilled impostor attack. In the existing literature, only random
impostor attacks (zero-effort attacks) and spoof attacks have been consid-
ered so far as attacks against verification systems. In addition to traditional
verification protocols with random impostor attacks, we have proposed a
new verification protocol which performs skilled impostor attacks. This pro-
tocol should be used in evaluations of fingerprint verification performance
and for determining the operational threshold of a system. If such choices
are based on the results of traditional verification tests only, the operating
company is in the dark about the possibilities and capabilities of potential
attackers and takes the risk to enormously underestimate the chances of a
successful attack. Such a fingerprint verification system might be vulnerable
to skilled impostor attacks. The results of verification tests with skilled im-
postor attacks allow a more realistic assessment of potential vulnerabilities
and enable a more informed decision regarding a trade-off between security
(low false acceptance rates) on the one hand, and usability and convenience
for the user (low false rejection rates) on the other hand.
In the light of an increasing pervasiveness of fingerprint recognition sys-
tems and a strong trend towards authenticating financial transaction by
fingerprint verification, honest evaluations of factual system performance
and weaknesses are needed.
Topics deserving further research include possible measures to increase
the security, e.g. by combining multiple fingers for a verification decision, or
by combining multiple modalities. Especially finger vein recognition [32] is
a promising candidate, because first public tests indicate that this modality
has the potential to achieve a comparable performance as fingerprint veri-
fication and sensors exist which acquire fingerprint and finger vein images
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Figure 3: A comparison of finger no. 88 impression 5 from FVC2002 DB1
(top left) and finger no. 43 impression 7 from FVC2004 DB3 (top right)
resulted in a score of 267. Comparing finger no. 81 impression 2 from
FVC2002 DB1 (bottom left) to finger no. 41 impression 8 from FVC2004
DB3 (bottom right) lead to a score of 155. Paired minutiae are visualized
in color, unpaired in white.
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Figure 4: Verification performance on FVC2002 DB1 using the same com-
parison algorithm and the same 2800 genuine recognition attempts. The
only difference between both experiments are the considered impostor recog-
nition attempts: 4950 random impostors (blue) according to the FVC pro-
tocol and 800 skilled impostors (red).
simultaneously [33]. Such sensors can be integrated into an ATM, whereas
an integration into smartphones for mobile payment may be more challeng-
ing.
Moreover, research on biometric cryptosystems should be considered as a
potential source for solutions which aim for a protected storage of fingerprint
data. Main objectives of biometric cryptosystems are irreversibility, unlink-
ability and revocability. A survey on approaches to achieve these goals is
given in [34]. Security considerations and vulnerabilities of biometric cryp-
tosystems are analyzed and discussed in [35, 36].
In conclusion, we would like to emphasize that the skilled impostor at-
tack is independent of the choice of a specific fingerprint database or a
specific comparison algorithm. In fact, the described attack and the pro-
posed protocol for evaluating verification performance is even independent
from its application to fingerprint recognition. A future research direction is
to transfer the idea of skilled impostor attacks to other modalities like e.g.
finger vein, speaker, face or iris recognition and to perform verification tests
according to the new protocol with skilled impostors.
We believe that all biometric modalities which can be captured at a dis-
tance (fingerprint, face, iris, ear [37], gait) or leave traces behind (fingerprint,
signatures) are especially vulnerable to this attack, whereas modalities like
finger vein or electroencephalogram (EEG) based biometric recognition [38]
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are less susceptible to this kind of attack.
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